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REIMAGINING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
DAVID LANGE*
In a paper included among this collection of works from the Duke Law
School’s Conference on the Public Domain, James Boyle kindly credits an early
essay of mine, Recognizing the Public Domain,1 with having contributed initially
to the contemporary study of the subject.2  Boyle quotes a passage from that
essay in which I suggested that “recognition of new intellectual property inter-
ests should be offset today by equally deliberate recognition of individual rights
in the public domain . . . . Each [intellectual property] right ought to be marked
off clearly against the public domain.”3
“But what does this mean?”  Boyle asks.  “What is the nature of these ‘indi-
vidual rights in the public domain?’  Who holds them?  Indeed, what is the
public domain?”
These are fair questions.  I cannot respond to them fully, for the fact is that I
have never tried to define the public domain, not even for myself.4  Boyle’s
paper gains a portion of its power and its appeal from his own contemplation of
these questions, but in the end I think he would agree that even he has suc-
ceeded only in approaching a number of definitions.
In its usage to date, the term “public domain” is elastic and inexact.  A defi-
nition can be but one of many definitions, each surely a function of perspective
and agenda, more or less as Boyle suggests.  His own perspective, one in which
he sees the expansion of intellectual property rights as “a second enclosure
movement” reminiscent of the English land enclosure movement of the Nine-
teenth Century, is intriguing.  From this perspective, the public domain is per-
haps most usefully seen as a commons, set off against the fences that delimit the
interests of individual rights holders.  I have no important quarrel with this per-
spective, and indeed think it enormously useful for many purposes—among
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Portions of this essay draw upon earlier works and presentations by the author.  Special thanks to
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1. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn
1981) [hereinafter Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain].
2. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 59 (Winter/Spring 2003).  Jamie also kindly acknowledges me as a friend
and colleague, an acknowledgment I warmly reciprocate.
3. Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, supra note 1, at 147-50.
4. A more comprehensive effort at definition will be reflected in a book by Jennifer Anderson
and me (Reading the Public Domain), now under contract with The Stanford University Press and due
for delivery in 2004.  The copyright in that book will be held by The Stanford Press.
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them, for the purposes of imagining a “politics of the commons” while address-
ing common interests in cyberspace, two important areas of inquiry in which
Boyle’s own scholarly agenda particularly lies.5
But this public domain is not my public domain.  More precisely, it is not the
public domain that matters to me most.  And I have thought that perhaps it
would be appropriate to say a bit more fully what I had in mind when I wrote
my essay some twenty years ago.  This is, I think, only the second occasion
when I have attempted to do so publicly,6 and it will certainly be the first in
which I try in addition to bring my thinking from that time into some degree of
harmony with my thinking today.  Not that such an exercise will matter to pos-
terity.  But Boyle does raise the question of meaning in general, and I suppose
that I, like others, am free to respond to the question in particular.
I
Sometime late in the middle nineteen-seventies a graduate of the Duke Law
School, Edward Rubin7, then a distinguished practitioner in Los Angeles spe-
cializing in motion picture transaction law, invited me to join him and a number
of others in organizing what became the American Bar Association’s Forum
Committee on the Entertainment and Sports Industries.  In 1979, the Forum
Committee gave its inaugural symposium on issues affecting entertainment law.
The symposium was held in Beverly Hills, and to me fell the task of preparing a
lecture on the then still new (or new-ish) subject of publicity rights.  Two cases
were pending in the California court system at the time: one brought by heirs of
Bela Lugosi8, the other by the heirs of Rudolph Guglielmi9, better known to the
public as Rudolph Valentino, whose fevered kisses in The Sheik had quickened
the pulse of more than one otherwise suitably composed young woman of the
nineteen-twenties.  I had just begun to teach at the Law School when these
cases first appeared in 1971 or so; the subject matter interested me from the
perspective of both intellectual property and tort law.  I looked forward to the
Beverly Hills lecture as an opportunity to think aloud about the several ques-
tions then still at large in the publicity field, among them, most importantly (or
so I thought at the time), the question of post-death succession.10
5. See Boyle, supra note 2.  Jamie’s work is always more textured and sophisticated than a brief
account of it can accommodate.  But as I intend neither a critical response to, nor an adequate appre-
ciation of, this excellent essay I shall count upon the reader to be forewarned, and Jamie to be forgiv-
ing, of such lapses as I may be guilty of in my attempt to summarize it here.
6. The first (and, at most, partial) occasion was my Donald Brace Memorial Lecture to the Copy-
right Society of America in 1992.  That lecture was subsequently published as David Lange, Copyright
and the Constitution in the Age of Intellectual Property, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 119 (1993).  The narrative
in this part of my present essay draws upon events partially recalled and described in the Brace Lec-
ture, though I did not truly attempt there what I intend to try here.
7. Class of 1936.
8. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. App. Super. 1972), rev’d, 70 Cal. App. 3d
552 (1977), aff’d, 25 Cal. 3d 813 (1979).
9. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860 (1979).
10. I shall not detail the underlying issues in these cases.  They were finally resolved at the end of
1979 when the California Supreme Court held that publicity rights did not descend as such in Califor-
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But when the hour for my lecture at last arrived, and I had scarcely begun to
speak, I was confronted by a barrage of challenging questions, angry and dis-
tressed in tone and nature, the gist of which was that this new right of publicity
threatened the questioners’ ability to create new works.  I could see why.
Among the members of my audience, in addition to the lawyers whose presence
I had expected, were screenwriters from the Hollywood community, to whom
publicity was not just an intriguing new interest the law might or might not
appropriately choose to recognize in one fashion or another, but rather an
expansion of private rights in intellectual property that would correspondingly
diminish the writers’ ability to borrow freely from lives whose dramatic value
could mean the difference between a salable script and just another bootless
Pitch From Hell.  In effect, or so it seemed, the law of publicity was dispossess-
ing individual creators in order to benefit the interests of celebrities, or, even
more remarkable, their estates and heirs, since many of the celebrities them-
selves were long since dead.
I confronted an epiphany in the course of that lecture, one whose dimen-
sions were not clear to me, but whose power to grip my imagination and to
excite my passions I could neither deny nor resist.  Though it would take
another two years to translate these emotions and the resulting insights into a
published essay, I knew that I would never again confront intellectual property
without thinking about its capacity to encroach upon the public domain—and
about the costs to the creative imagination of that encroachment—in a new and
far darker way than I had done before.
I say “the public domain,” and here I must acknowledge the first transfor-
mation in my thinking as I confronted what had happened in LA:
Like others at the time I suppose I had thought of the public domain mainly
as whatever was left over after intellectual property had finished satisfying its
appetite.11  Now I saw that the public domain demanded recognition as an
affirmative entity, conferring its own protection (which I imagined as in the
nia.  That holding has since been supplanted by statute.  For an article summarizing the publicity rights
questions at the time (and particularly the question of descendibility), see Peter L. Felcher & Edward
L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979).
For a more recent (and approving) appraisal of publicity rights, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73
IND. L.J. 1 (1997).
11. I am uncertain as to the origins of the “feeding” metaphor.  I believe it to be in rather common
use today, but was it then?  I do not think so.  At the time, I noted that:
Remarkably little direct attention has been paid to the public domain in recent years; there
seem to have been no extended treatments of the subject in its own terms . . . . The prevailing
view probably was expressed by the writer who observed that “as the phrase ‘in the public
domain’ has generally been used in the cases, it is much less an empirical datum than simply
the reflection of an ultimate legal conclusion.”  Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State
Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927, 967 n.184 (1974).  Compare
Krasilovsky, Observations on Public Domain, 14 BULL. CR. SOC. 205, 205 (1967) (“Public
domain in the fields of literature, drama, music and art is the other side of the coin of copy-
right.  It is best defined in negative terms.  It lacks the private property element granted under
copyright in that there is no legal right to exclude others from enjoying it and is ‘free as the air
to common use.’” ).
Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, supra note 1, at 150-53 n.20.
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nature of rights) upon individual creators; this would be necessary if creativity
itself was to survive the tendency toward expansionism that seemed to be bur-
geoning everywhere among the intellectual property doctrines.  In that sense,
my perspective was the perspective of creative artists (in Hollywood and else-
where), to whom intellectual property was not necessarily an incentive or an
inducement or an encouragement to create, but rather always a potential
impediment to creativity, and on occasion a real and powerful disincentive to
the very activity intellectual property was meant to bring about. An opposing
concept was required, a concept to be set in affirmative opposition to intellec-
tual property.  Of course one might invent a term to fit that need, but it seemed
to me that existing terminology would do nicely.  As I envisioned my project,
the public domain would be pressed into service beyond its accustomed role.
No longer a lesser neighborhood on the wrong side of the tracks, it would serve
as a recognizable place of refuge for creative endeavor in its own right.
An atavistic restlessness was companion to my thoughts.  I remember par-
ticularly that scenes from Singin’ in the Rain flooded my imagination as I
reflected on what it means to be creative—a meaning I thought perfectly cap-
tured in Gene Kelly and Cyd Charisse’s transcendent production number from
that film, Gotta Dance!  And here was a subtle point: I was concerned not
merely with the very public, formal, organized creativity of Hollywood (though
certainly that had brought me to this work); what moved me no less was a con-
cern for those who, like the character Kelly portrayed in that sequence, might
be driven by pure need toward transient episodes of creative expression neither
intended nor likely to find any public outlet.
I would say then, first, in response to Boyle’s inquiry after meaning, that for
me recognizing the public domain began as a rather straightforward appropria-
tion of perfectly ordinary terminology as part of a larger exercise in iconoclasm
intended to transform that terminology in the course of a new service.  I was
interested at the outset in gaining recognition for a different sort of public
domain.  The public domain I had in mind would become a place of sanctuary
for individual creative expression, a sanctuary conferring affirmative protection
against the forces of private appropriation that threatened such expression.
Recognition for that sanctuary was the challenge.  Meaning would follow.  I
supposed that definitions could wait.
II
The work I hoped for in those early days was not quite the work I produced
in the end.  Something of the passion survived in what I finally published, per-
haps: Boyle suggests that my essay reflected indignation, and “eloquently sar-
castic ridicule” of the widespread expansionism of that time.  But the particular
concerns for creativity that prompted me to write in the first place were actually
somewhat muted by the structure I ultimately settled upon for the work.  Where
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Jessica Litman12 later wrote directly about the relationship between creativity
and the public domain, for example, my own concerns for that relationship I left
mainly to others to express, in quoted passages dispersed among a number of
other issues I decided to address as part of my strategy for encouraging the
wider recognition of the public domain I sought.
Thanks to the heartfelt eloquence of these additional voices, creativity
remained a central concern in the essay.  One such cri de coeur (written by Cali-
fornia practitioner Anthony Liebig, and prompted by litigation between Nancy
Sinatra and the Fifth Dimension) was powerful then and remains so now, not
merely as an observation on the issues raised in a long-forgotten case, but more
generally as a living commentary upon the impediments to creativity engen-
dered by encroachments upon the public domain:
From the standpoint of performers . . . the right to perform in the popular genre or
style is essential.  Freedom of a performer to earn a living by adopting—either con-
sciously or because he is “influenced” or simply “with it”—current modes and styles
which may be widely or even uniformly demanded is, indeed, imperative.  How else
can he support himself and develop?  Any limitation upon absolute freedom of per-
formance—while it might result in short-lived bonanzas for one or two performers—
would self-evidently be stultifying to performers as a class.
Just how stultifying becomes clear when one considers the predictable volume of
litigation and threatened litigation which would follow from any such limitation cou-
pled with the equally predictable inconsistency of result.  After several hundred years
copyright infringement, which involves only comparison of dimensional self-described
works, is still a mystery . . . . We could hardly expect the courts to set parameters and
fashion workable, understandable standards of comparison in “imitation” cases in this
century!  In the meantime, what about the performers and artists and their dissemina-
tors who wish to go about their business unhindered?
. . . .
From the standpoint of the audience, society at large, and cultural growth,
encroachment on the freedom of performance would be destructive both qualitatively
and quantitatively.  Consider any artist, musician, or performer of any era and ponder
what his oeuvre would have amounted to had he been precluded from utilizing the
brush techniques, color principles, scales, meters, cadences, sounds, moods and meth-
ods—in short, the styles—of those who had gone before.  Would the classical periods
of music and painting have been limited to but one producer each?  Would Presley
have been foreclosed as an imitator or would he have had the right to foreclose those
who came after him?  Would the lost generation of American writers have wasted
itself in litigation to determine who “got with it” first?  Indeed, could there have been
a Renaissance?  Would we have had a Brahms, a Rubens, a Steinbeck?  Or, for that
matter, a Sinatra or Fifth Dimension?13
Here, indeed, was passion in the service of indignation.
For my own part, I began the essay with some attention to a central problem
in intellectual property, namely, the problem of defining the boundaries of a
property interest embodied in an intangible res.  I turned then to what I had
begun to see as a kind of metastasis in the law, particularly in the developing
law of publicity, but no less so in the laws of trademark dilution and unfair
12. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
13. Anthony Liebig, Style and Performance, 17 BULL. COPR. SOC’Y 40, 46-7 (1969).
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competition (of the misappropriation variety), both of which latter doctrines
had troubled me before.  I passed over lightly both copyright and patent law on
the (then plausible but now quite clearly erroneous) assumption that these well-
established areas of intellectual property law were essentially stabilized in their
relationship to the public domain by internal doctrinal mechanisms designed to
avoid undue encroachments.  I turned finally to a section of the essay in which I
offered some suggestions meant to secure greater functional recognition for the
public domain, suggestions aimed mainly at courts, though as it turned out
within a year or so after publication, susceptible to adoption by Congress as
well.14  Along the way I invited comparison between the public domains in
intellectual property and in public lands.  And I concluded with an allusion to
the buffalo now vanished from the American prairie, an allusion that, frankly, I
have sometimes wished since I could alter or withdraw.
It is of course idle to dwell upon such second thoughts as the ones I have
hinted at here.  Motivation and strategy often diverge, in the work of a scholar
no less than in the work of an artist.  I will acknowledge, however, that my
motivation for writing now is in part to readdress, more directly, the concerns
for creativity that drove me then, and to suggest in passing at least a partial,
personal answer to the questions Boyle raises.
Not that I had neglected these questions altogether: the twentieth footnote
to Recognizing the Public Domain reveals how quickly I succumbed to an
examination of the public domain considerably less sanguine than I initially had
in mind.  Indeed, as I began to research the issues, and then to write, I found
myself asking questions of the very sort that Boyle has asked: What was the
public domain?  How had it been understood?  Was there a theory worthy of
the name?  Could abiding definitions be sensed in the cases or in the literature?
And so on.15  I shall spare the reader an extended exegesis of the numerous and
diverse works considered in this very long note; they are faded now, as is my
essay.16  Definitions I left for others.  But as for theory—theory as I understand
theory; that is, an exercise in intellectual accounting that ordinarily precedes
definitions —I did record that, in the course of my passage through the insights
I had gathered from among these works and from my own reflections, a tenta-
tive theory actually had begun to suggest itself.  It was unnecessary to my pur-
pose to pursue the theory at length in that essay, though, and potentially a dis-
14. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 440-42 (1985) (acknowledging “the Lange
test” as a benchmark for new legislation).  Of course, that was then, and only briefly: sic transit gloria
mundi.
15. Compare Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, supra note 1, at 150-53 n.20 and accompany-
ing text, with Boyle, supra note 2, at 59.
16. Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, supra note 1, at 150-53 n.20.  It is worth noting, though,
that even a cursory glance at the materials cited in this note and in the remainder of the article reveals
how many of the issues we discuss today, as if new, had been anticipated then.  See, e.g., Kenneth E.
Kulzick & Amy D. Hogue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
57, 77-78 (1980) (suggesting that the burden of proof be shifted from defendant to plaintiff in cases
involving fair use).
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traction.  My ambition was affirmative recognition for the public domain
simpliciter, and my medium a polemic in the guise of a scholarly essay.  Con-
strained by that goal and that form, I was candid in not attending to the nicer
questions of definition and theory.  These matters I consigned to a few glancing
passages in the text and to another footnote toward the end of the piece.  In
truth, questions of this sort have begun to be attended to quite widely in the
decades since.  Boyle’s paper and the Conference on the Public Domain itself
are testament enough to that.
But what was the theory I laid to one side?  Essentially this: that an ade-
quate comprehension of the public domain might actually have to begin with a
considerably more radical and dramatic reimagining of intellectual property
than I professed to see as necessary earlier in the essay, a reimagining that
would marry concepts in unfair competition after Sears 17 and Compco18 with
intimate moral rights, so as ultimately to make room for the sanctuary I had ini-
tially envisioned.  I had begun by supposing that rights in proprietors and rights
in the public domain could stand more or less on equal footing as parties inter
pares to a property-based regime.  But as I worked my way through the piece I
began to doubt whether this was so.  By the time I reached the last of the half
dozen suggestions I offered for action, I had come to think that the problem
with intellectual property was in the nature of property itself—not merely in the
boundary-fixing difficulties with which I had begun the piece, but rather in the
far more central ability of proprietors to exclude others from their works in ple-
nary fashion, and to demand compensation for trespass where no damage nec-
essarily might follow.
I do not mean to claim too much in the way of insight through hindsight.
Certainly I did not piece my thoughts together in quite the way I mean to do
here.  This is representative of what I did say:
I have meant to convey two principal objections to the new thrust of the law.  One is
that it tends to reward a species of claim which almost always lacks definition and fre-
quently lacks either a substantial showing of entitlement or any realistic evidence of a
taking.  The other is that the very momentum of these expanding claims tends to blur,
and then displace, important individual and collective rights in the public domain . . . .
[C]ourts ought to indulge at least a presumption against new claims. . . . [I]n cases in
which it appears sensible to recognize new (or doubtful) intellectual property claims, it
will be appropriate for the court to explain what is not covered by the grant as well.
An explicit reservation of the public domain in these circumstances must be seen as a
part of the court’s obligation to be clear about the holding . . . . Inevitably, the work of
defining the public domain . . . will follow and, we can hope, a more appropriate bal-
ance will be restored to the field of intellectual property19 . . . . It may be that the key
to defining the scope of the public domain in a satisfactory way is to be found in a
comparison of the natural law (or “moral”) basis of intellectual property with the
more specific, occasional need to define and provide for certain economic or commer-
cial interests not necessarily limited to authors and not necessarily the products of
authorship . . . . [A]s often as possible, courts ought to divert claims away from intel-
lectual property theory and into such adjacent areas of law as the original form of
17. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
18. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964)
19. Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, supra note 1, at 171-177 (citations omitted).
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unfair competition, contracts or, perhaps, some species of moral rights.  There can be
little damage to the public domain in requiring precautions designed to prevent genu-
ine deception or confusion; Sears and Compco would have permitted as much.  Nor
does there seem to be any legitimate objection to moral rights requirements such as
attribution of authorship, although rights against distortion, truncation, mutilation and
the like are obviously another matter20 . . . . Meanwhile, courts must be sensitive to the
taking too trivial to be actionable as well as the taking which produces apportionable
profits.  In doubtful cases . . . the defendant ought always to prevail.21
A shift in proprietary rights away from property to what today would no
doubt be termed a “liability” regime22 (and by implication a corresponding
withdrawal from the ready availability of injunctive relief, and perhaps a move
toward compulsory licenses on a much wider basis23); a presumption against new
proprietary interests, with doubtful cases always to be resolved in favor of the
doubt; an increased concern for classic unfair competition concepts (confusion
as opposed to misappropriation), with corresponding reliance upon disclaimers
and the like as alternatives to exclusion; a frank embrace of the intimate aspects
of moral rights, including the rights to acknowledgment and attribution, but
with no provision at all for concerns grounded in appropriation; with a diminu-
tion in damage awards in trivial cases, accompanied by an equitable apportion-
ment of profits—and meanwhile, beyond and above all these radical re-configu-
rations of the proprietary rights regimes, a corresponding re-conceptualization
of the public domain itself, but now a public domain enlarged in standing so as
to render presumptively paramount the rights it would confer as against the
reduced proprietary rights it would constrain: These were the essay’s implicit
strategies for realizing the creative sanctuary I envisioned.  In this way the
public domain itself could become a place of refuge for creative expression, a
place of individual no less than collective entitlement, dimensioned both physi-
cally and conceptually, and sanctioned by law.  In short, the public domain
would be a place like home, where, when you go there, they have to take you in
and let you dance.
This is close to what I might have said in answer to Boyle’s questions on the
basis of what I wrote twenty years ago, had I thought to say more than I did.
III
But it is not quite what I would say today.
20. Id. at 177 n.137.
21. Id. at 174.
22. Cf. Boyle, supra note 2, at 62-69.  This term has come into vogue—when, how and why, exactly,
I do not know.  I distrust it intensely in that it seems to imply a compensable “wrong” in appropriation,
a notion that I reject entirely.
23. I suggested as much (albeit with reservations and some hedging) in testimony before Congress
in 1984, in connection with hearings on the Record Rental Amendment.  See Audio and Video First
Sale Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029, and S. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Lib-
erties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 98th Congress, 1st & 2d
Sess. 2 (1983-1984), at 723 (statement of Professor Lange, cited in Kastenmeier & Remington, supra
note 14, at 440.  Today I might choose another way to express the thought, for this reason: compulsory
licensing may appear to perpetuate the primacy of intellectual property in a scheme of things where I
would rather see the public domain at the epicenter and intellectual property as an exception.
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In the first place, I am more skeptical about the utility in efforts to reform
intellectual property doctrines than I was when I wrote that essay.  Note that I
do not say “skeptical of the prospects for reform.”  Unlikely though I know
some students of the field believe it to be, I actually suppose that intellectual
property is susceptible to reform, not merely through action by courts, as
seemed sensible twenty years ago, but through direct political action in the
Congress and legislatures of the states.  Consider copyright, for example.
The Copyright Society’s FACE Initiative,24 which proposes a direct appeal
by copyright proprietors and their representatives to primary and secondary
school students across the country, suggests to me that the agendas of the prin-
cipal copyright industries (the recording and motion picture industries foremost
among them, in company with publishers) are more imperiled than they are
generally understood to be by outsiders.  Houston’s Raymond Nimmer has said
that copyright cannot survive unless it is accorded widespread acquiescence by
the citizenry.25  I think his insight is acutely perceptive and absolutely correct,
for a reason that I also understand him to endorse: Never before has copyright
so directly confronted individuals in their private lives.  Copyright is omnipres-
ent.  But what has to be understood as well is that copyright is also corre-
spondingly over-extended.  Absent a wide and no less individual acquiescence,
copyright simply may not survive its encounter with the populace at large.  It is
in part this insight, I suppose, that animates the Copyright Society in its FACE
Initiative.
I confess to reservations about this initiative for reasons beyond the paro-
chial concerns of copyright.  I think it fundamentally wrong to insist that chil-
dren internalize the proprietary and moral values of the copyright system.  I
fear the encroachment upon the formation and growth of creativity that these
values represent when they are not suitably constrained—as we cannot count
upon them to be in our time.  We should be haunted, for example, by the
familiar story of Helen Keller, a child (her world so unimaginably circum-
scribed) whose early efforts at creative self-expression were damaged irrepara-
bly by harsh accusations of plagiarism, accusations leveled against her by a
mentor from whom she had reason to expect more in the way of empathy and
judgment than he proved capable of mustering.26  He proved, indeed, to be a
24. See Friends of Active Copyright Education Web Site, at http://www.face-copyright.org/ (last
visited February 10, 2003).  The initiative is aimed directly and primarily at children and is meant to
teach them about copyright values, especially as an antidote to peer-to-peer file sharing.
25. Cf. David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 224 n.53 (Spring 1996).
26. Keller wrote a story (The Frost King) which she gave to her mentor, a man named Michael
Anagnos, the director of the Perkins Institution for the Blind in Boston which Keller attended.  Anag-
nos published the story as evidence of Keller’s accomplishments, only to discover later that it appeared
to have been taken, nearly verbatim, from an earlier story published by a woman named Margaret
Canby.  Anagnos brought charges of plagiarism against Keller.  She was formally exonerated after a
hearing, essentially on the ground that whatever she had done was unconscious or unknowing.  But the
accusation and inquiry scarred her; she said later that she never wrote comfortably again.  This episode
(something of a cause célèbre a century ago, and one addressed in Keller’s autobiography as well as in
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monster, not a mentor, and his assaults proved destructive to the creative efforts
of his imprisoned ward for the balance of her life.  But then, apart from the
extremity of his appalling judgment and consequent cruelty, how was he unlike
any other man or woman who believes in the moral or intellectual or legal sanc-
tity of exclusive rights in expression?27  The case is extreme, to be sure.  But the
lesson within it should be central to us all.  Children do not come naturally to
understand that it is wrong to appropriate creative expression—for the good
and sufficient reason, I would argue, that it is not naturally wrong.  Creativity
and appropriation are inseparable, as inseparable as creativity and memory, and
in my judgment they should remain so, at whatever cost may follow to whatever
other belief systems (including copyright) may thus be obliged to stand aside.
But let us lay these broader issues to one side.  I know the members of the
Copyright Society to be well-intentioned.  There are no monsters among
them—only decent and honorable professionals, as committed to their views as
I am to mine.28  The point remains: Copyright is vulnerable.  The FACE Initia-
tive may backfire.
A contest for the hearts and minds of a public is always in doubt unless
whatever is at issue makes common sense.  And here I think is copyright’s
dilemma in the matter of the FACE Initiative: Copyright probably does not
make common sense in the private lives of individuals.29  Imagine the member-
standard biographies of her life) is usefully discussed in Jim Swan, Touching Words: Helen Keller, Pla-
giarism, Authorship, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW
AND LITERATURE 57 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds., 1994).  Swan’s account of the incident
is textured and intriguing, but even he does not appear to see the accusations against Keller as the
straightforward assault upon her creativity that I do.  In my view, it simply does not matter that she may
have “known” the earlier work: if she considered the work she “created” to be hers, then I would say it
was, never mind its provenance.  This is what I understand to be implicit in the perfectly ordinary con-
cept of creativity called “making a find.”  See Richard Schiff, Making a Find: An Argument for Creativ-
ity, Not Originality, STRUCTURALIST REV., Spring 1984, at 59.
27. Keller’s tormentors were moved by concerns for academic integrity, not copyright.  I do
acknowledge this difference, but it does not alter my point here.  Protests to the contrary notwith-
standing, plagiarism charges in the academy typically spring from, and are driven by, the same mis-
guided sense of ownership of expression that in copyright leads to claims of proprietary rights.  When
that is not so— when, in other words, the academy’s investment in protection is grounded in genuine
concerns for provenance, rather than entitlement on the part of the putative “author” and a concomi-
tant concern for enhancement of the author’s reputation—the charges should be muted and the remedy
essentially one of attribution or acknowledgment.  Appropriation is then a matter of legitimate concern
only to the extent that these markers of provenance are deliberately withheld, and only when the with-
holding is essentially in furtherance of a genuine purpose to defraud or mislead.  That can happen, but
usually the fault, if there is one, is in ignorance, haste, carelessness, misjudgment or indifference—and
even these are appropriately judged as venial, not mortal, sins. Cf. Judith Hughes, The Fuzzy Side of
Intellectual Dishonesty: Placing Academic Honesty in an Epistemological Context (2002), at
http://www.cade-aced.ca/icdepapers/hughes.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).  Meanwhile, it is perfectly
clear that Keller had no idea she had done anything wrong at all.
28. This is not a pro forma disclaimer.  I only recently completed a term as a member of the Board
of Trustees of the Society.  I number many members of the Society among my closest and most valued
professional acquaintances and personal friends.
29. I am sometimes asked whether I think there is any place for copyright at all in the general
system of freedom for creativity I favor.  The short answer is that I do.  In commercial settings, for
example, copyright can play a perfectly appropriate role if suitably constrained.  Under the 1909 Act,
copyright was essentially so constrained; as Boyle points out, one had to work hard to infringe.  See
Boyle, supra note 2, at 40.  Advances in technology make the restraint of the 1909 Act a matter for nos-
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ship of the Parent-Teacher Associations of all the schools on the FACE Initia-
tive hit list suddenly encouraged and even obliged to pay close and heretofore
unaccustomed attention to copyright.  What then?  Now fully aware for the first
time of the potential for present limitations on their children’s education that
copyright actually presupposes,30 are millions of parents and thousands of teach-
ers likely to smile politely and join hands in support of the motion picture and
recording and publishing industries’ agenda?  I think not.  Not merely because
the copyright industries say their agendas are fair and just; not merely because
economists promise that things will work out for the better, one fine tomorrow;
not even if  “it’s the law”—not, in short, if it means that kids today do without
access to information and materials presently at hand and readily available but
for copyright.  The agenda is politics, not property, not fairness, not justice, not
economics or law.  The potential for a present backlash at the ballot box is
obvious and inescapable, perhaps unanswerable.  If that backlash happens,
copyright reform will follow.
In the end, I am simply not persuaded that reform will suffice.  Not if the
goal is my goal, which is still to secure maximum freedom for the creative
imagination.  There is some slippage in terminology here, to be sure.  Perhaps
what I have in mind today can fairly be thought of as reform.  But I think it
may come closer to revolution.  And if that revolution is to happen I suspect it
will have to happen on the public domain’s watch.
And let me speak here, again briefly in passing, to what I think of as one of
the least useful or persuasive notions to have sprung up in response to the
growing recognition of the public domain.  Professor Samuels and some others
have suggested that no matter how we may struggle, in the end the public
domain is whatever intellectual property is not.31  Conceptually, this can be so
only if one cannot envision the public domain as having an affirmative existence
of its own.  But that exercise does not require much, whether in the way of con-
ceptual thinking or envisioning.  Imagine an African veldt where lions and jack-
talgia today; that regime probably could not be reinstituted as such.  To be suitably constrained today,
copyright ideally would have to be converted into some version of an “opt-in” system—perhaps like the
Writers’ and Producers’ Guilds in the motion picture industry; or perhaps like the commons of the
General Public License described in Boyle’s article, which, as he quite correctly observes, is an alterna-
tive system of protection.  See id. at 44-45.  While copyright remains as it is under the 1976 Act, how-
ever, the best protection against its encroachments into private lives is a separate and paramount public
domain, from within which creativity can be promoted and defended.
30. What limitations?  Take these as commonplace examples of a considerably wider field: (1)
limits on photocopying, resulting in limits on “coursepaks”; (2) limits on the availability of musical
compositions, sound recordings, motion pictures and audiovisual aids in the classroom and beyond; and
(3) limits on internet access resulting from encoded content protected by the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.  These limits remain substantial even after the
passage of the TEACH Act, which was meant to address some issues affecting education.  Technology,
Education and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13301, 116 Stat. 1758,
1910-13.  All of these limitations adversely affect the ability of students to engage in the fullest use of
copyrighted works for educational purposes.  Not one of them has ever been vetted widely among the
parents or teachers of school-age children.
31. Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPR. SOC’Y U.S.A. 137 (1993);
see Boyle, supra note 2, at 71-73.
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als and gazelles dwell in uneasy symbiosis while the merciless sun shines down
dispassionately upon them.  There is symbiosis among them, yes, yet it requires
only this much (read: “a small pinch of”) imagination to understand these
inhabitants of the veldt as separate animals.  Indeed, the function of taxonomy
is to enable us to draw these singularly useful, but also elementary, distinctions.
You have to be a lion- or jackal-lover of truly limited imagination or unlimited
commitment to argue that gazelles are to be understood as no more than what-
ever is left over after their adversaries have finished feeding.  For my own part,
I am not much interested in reforming the predators and scavengers among us.
My project is to recognize gazelles as gazelles—and not merely to recognize
them, but to give them the means with which to defend themselves against their
natural enemies.
Intellectual property can go on being intellectual property, reformed or oth-
erwise.  Meanwhile, the public domain certainly can and should be envisioned
as a thing apart, and strengthened accordingly.
What is needed then, in my view, is an additional reimagining of the public
domain we have come to recognize.  As James Boyle observes, the recurring
metaphor for the public domain today is mainly that of place: a wilderness, a
commons, a sanctuary, a home.  These metaphors appear to follow from the
term “public domain” itself.  In some settings, this is undoubtedly a useful way
to think.  But from the perspective of creativity I think it no longer quite suf-
fices, if it ever did.
A better metaphor than place, I think, is status.  Imagine the public domain
as a status that arises from the exercise of the creative imagination, thus to
confer entitlements, privileges and immunities in the service of that exercise; a
status independently and affirmatively recognized in law, sometimes collective
in nature and sometimes individual, but omnipresent, portable and defining;
and a status meanwhile paramount to whatever inconsistent status may be con-
ferred upon a work of authorship (or its author) from time to time, whether that
work is protected as intellectual property, or is included within a so-called
liability regime, or is otherwise provided for.  One could imagine this sort of
public domain more particularly still, so as to include tenets peculiar to setting
or need, while suggesting the sources from which such a public domain might
derive.32  But in this essay I will merely suggest its nature, and even that some-
what indirectly—first, briefly, by way of simile supported by example; then, at
slightly greater length, through an analogy drawn from an appealing article in
32. Of course, one must eventually state plainly how such a public domain might be made a reality.
The ultimate sources of law, as I suppose them to be, are essentially four in number: a happy but
unlikely evolution in the main tenets of the relevant positive law; the First Amendment; the Intellectual
Property Clause; and an international convention, perhaps grounded in human rights.  None of these is
to play any real role in this essay.  But I am at work (with my Duke colleague Jeff Powell) on a book on
the First Amendment in which we do address these issues somewhat directly.  That book, No Law:
Intellectual Property in the Absolute Image of the First Amendment, is under contract with the Stanford
University Press, and is scheduled for completion within the coming year.
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the contemporary literature, and finally, through an example of how a public
domain so configured might actually work in practice.
Let us envision the public domain as if it were a status like citizenship, but a
“citizenship” arising from the exercise of creative imagination rather than as a
concomitant of birth.33  It is surely no challenge to identify creativity and imagi-
nation with citizenship in a more conventional sense.  This is indeed consistent
with a perfectly ordinary understanding of citizenship, now well established in
American life and by no means original with us.  The Roman historian Tacitus,
writing of the reigns of the Emperor Nerva and Trajan, observed: “Such was the
happiness of the times that men could think as they pleased and speak as they
thought.”34  Justice Brandeis appropriated that insight (without attribution) in
Whitney v. California, in which he identified thinking and speaking as principal
objects of First Amendment protection.35  Here, then, is an idea powerful
enough to transcend its origins: happiness as a function of thinking and speak-
ing freely, and each of these as an attribute of desirable citizenship.  I suggest in
turn that thinking of the public domain as conferring a status akin to citizen-
ship—but now a citizenship of the creative imagination—is little more than a
step away from civic republicanism toward a clearer understanding of the rec-
ognition and protection that exercises of creativity require and should beget.
For make no mistake: It is protection, not merely recognition or definition,
that we need.  A concept like citizenship can serve usefully here, as it has for
thousands of years.
Consider, for example, the Apostle Paul’s claim upon citizenship in this
account drawn from the Book of Acts.  Paul, born Saul of Tarsus in Silesia, a
Jew but also a Roman and now an apostate, is preaching the Gospel of Christ in
Jerusalem Temple, to the intense displeasure of the devout, and the resulting
discomfort of Claudius Lysias, Chief Captain of the Roman Guard, whose task
it is to maintain order in this important but beleaguered outpost of the Empire:
And as they cried out, and cast off their clothes, and threw dust into the air,
The chief captain commanded him to be brought into the castle, and bade that he
should be examined by scourging; that he might know wherefore they cried so against
him.
33. Though I am unaware of any suggestion quite like this, I mean to make no claim of originality
here, and will cheerfully accept the representations of anyone who does claim it.  In some part I imag-
ine the idea occurred to me as a result of John Perry Barlow’s interesting suggestions for a “citizenship
of the net,” a notion now very commonly expressed in the term “netizens” – though in truth I am actu-
ally not much interested in the net as a special province of concern.  And I may have been influenced
by the concepts developed in Jed Rubenfeld’s recent essay, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, which was published last year in the YALE LAW JOURNAL, and which I had the
pleasure of reading while it was still in manuscript.  See infra note 37, and accompanying text.  In any
event, whatever the genesis of the idea may be, I do think it apt, and have merely tried to develop it
here as an alternative to place.
34. 1 TACITUS, THE HISTORIES, § 1 (A.D. 109).  I have employed this cite in a number of earlier
essays.
35. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
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And as they bound him with thongs, Paul said unto the centurion that stood by, Is it
lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman, and uncondemned?
When the centurion heard that, he went and told the chief captain, saying, Take heed
what thou doest: for this man is a Roman.
Then the chief captain came, and said unto him, Tell me, art thou a Roman?  He said,
Yea.
And the chief captain answered, With a great sum obtained I this freedom.  And Paul
said, But I was free born.
Then straightway they departed from him which should have examined him: and the
chief captain also was afraid, after he knew that he was a Roman, and because he had
bound him.36
Civis Romanus Sum: As in this example, and like the model originally pro-
posed above, citizenship is a status independently and affirmatively recognized
in law.  It confers entitlements, privileges and immunities, sometimes collective
in nature and sometimes individual.  It is omnipresent, portable and defining.
Above all, it is capable of achieving paramountcy vis-à-vis rights, obligations or
constraints otherwise imposed by law.  I do not say that the public domain is
exactly equivalent to citizenship.  I do say that it might profitably take on these
attributes of citizenship in securing protection for exercises of the creative
imagination against the claims otherwise to be made under rights now sounding
in intellectual property or its successors.
A similar suggestion can be seen in a recent essay by Jed Rubenfeld,37 who
argues that the First Amendment should be read to protect what he calls “the
freedom of imagination.”  The analogy is plain.  I envision a public domain con-
figured so as to offer attributes akin to the status of citizenship in the service of
creative imagination.  Rubenfeld envisions attributes of citizenship itself in that
service, particularly in the form of the First Amendment.  One must not go too
far.  These are not quite the same thoughts.  I am interested in the public
domain as an affirmative source of entitlements capable of deployment, as,
when and where required, against the encroachments upon the creative imagi-
nation threatened by intellectual property.  He is interested in the First
Amendment, but supposes that, were it read as it ought to be, some such
encroachments would necessarily be curtailed.38  He is not primarily interested
in developing his ideas as an exercise in fashioning public policy for intellectual
property.39  (For that matter, properly understood, neither am I.)  His project is
the First Amendment.  Mine is the public domain.  Taking these differences
fully into account, however, I am still much drawn to the parallels his argument
affords.
36. Acts 22:23-29 (King James).
37. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1
(2002).
38. Cf. id. at 13.
39. Id. at 58.
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To begin with, he relies upon an exercise of the imagination to invoke First
Amendment protection.  I would rely on a similar exercise to invoke the protec-
tion of the public domain.
Rubenfeld’s explicit inclusion of the imagination as the central focus of his
essay offers a neat resolution to a troublesome problem in envisioning the reach
and scope of the public domain.  This problem has been to bring within reach of
the public domain and its protection those kinds of appropriations that are crea-
tive but do not necessarily result in any form of public expression, or that may
result in no expression of any kind.  Reading is a classic example; Rubenfeld
treats reading as an exercise of the imagination and thus a central object of pro-
tection within the First Amendment.40  I suppose that Justice Brandeis’ inclusion
of “thinking” as a First Amendment value is close to the “imagination” that
Rubenfeld includes, and for some purposes may even be slightly the better
(more capacious) term, but there appears to be something useful in the more
focused connotations of “imagination” in this setting, where “creativity” and
“expression” already take on the color of terms of art.
To be sure, there is never any certainty in this term or that.  Imagination is
distinct from action in Rubenfeld’s view: “The freedom of imagination demands
that people be free to exercise their imagination.  It is not a freedom to do what
one imagines.”41  Violence, intentional misrepresentation (“knowingly denying
that an exercise of imagination is an exercise of imagination” 42), misinforma-
tion—these are among the arguable exercises of the imagination that are not
within the freedom Rubenfeld envisions. And piracy: “When copyright law bars
simple piracy, it does not punish infringers for exercising their imagination.  It
punishes them for failing to exercise their imagination—for failing to add any
new imaginative content to the copied material.”43
I suppose that peer-to-peer file sharing (à la Napster, for example) would
not qualify as an exercise of imagination under the test Rubenfeld himself has
in mind here.  And what about appropriation artists like Damian Loeb,44 or
Negativland,45 or Sherrie Levine?46  Would they be protected?  Rubenfeld’s
analysis is additionally complex at this point because he would actually
approach the First Amendment question in cases like these from within the
matrix of copyright principles that have evolved from the derivative works
right.47  Thus, “not just any change in the original work should suffice to evade
the copyright holder’s reproduction right.  Trivial or obvious modifications, or
changes that involve no substantially new act of imagination, especially if intro-
40. See id. at 34-35.
41. Id. at 42.
42. Id. at 45.
43. Id. at 48.
44. See http://www.damianloeb.com/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
45. See http://www.negativland.com/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2003); Negativland, Two Relationships to
a Cultural Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 239 (Winter/Spring 2003).
46. See http://www.crownpoint.com/html/levine.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
47. Rubenfeld, supra note 37, at 49-60.
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duced to evade the reproduction right, should not qualify.  At bottom, the judge
is called on to decide whether the old has been reimagined—whether the alleg-
edly infringing new work is in fact new.”48  Appropriation artists might or might
not make the grade if this is to be the approach.  Negativland probably would,
its madcap thefts surely creative and imaginative under the strictest scrutiny.49
Loeb might, since in his work appropriation is mixed with elements of substan-
tial originality.50  Levine is another matter.  As I understand Rubenfeld, he
would not extend the freedom of imagination to appropriation artists whose art
appears objectively to consist of appropriation simpliciter, unmediated by addi-
tional affirmative acts of imagination.51  If Levine is that kind of artist (a ques-
tion Rubenfeld does not consider and one I need not resolve here), then she is
beyond the reach of the freedom of imagination.52
I expect I would apply Rubenfeld’s standard less restrictively than he.  I
think file-sharing involves substantial exercises of the imagination: the kids who
do it are producing music for themselves.  And Levine’s art (as I understand it)
appeals to me no less than the collage work of Negativland and Loeb.  But then,
should Rubenfeld and I differ, so what?  He can hardly be faulted for inter-
preting his own project in a way I do not entirely agree with.  The great value in
his work is the vision itself, a vision which places imagination at the center of
First Amendment protection.  In this vision I can and do concur entirely—
though in the end I continue to think that the public domain, configured as
suggested here, may offer the advantage of a somewhat more specific and
reliable protection.53  I shall conclude this essay with an elaboration upon how
that public domain might work in practice.
Consider copyright’s fair use doctrine.  Under the proposal I have advanced
here, that doctrine should now be seen as an affirmative aspect of the public
domain at large, rather than as a mere affirmative defense to an allegation of
48. Id. at 55.
49. See Negativland, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER U AND THE NUMERAL 2 (1995).
50. See supra note 44.
51. See Rubenfeld, supra note 37, at 48.
52. The reader can judge: see supra note 46.
53. The real difficulty with the First Amendment as a source for an expansive vision of the public
domain is that the Amendment has been so closely circumscribed by Supreme Court cases since the
early 1970s as to rob it of vitality, a constraining circumstance with which even the best scholars can
contend only up to a point. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).  In these
and many other articles first rate scholars are obliged to pick their way among doctrines that are fun-
damentally at odds with a decent concern for creativity.  Of course, this is in no sense a failing on their
part; to the contrary, their scholarship may appear to be the more elegant and heroic for their efforts.
Rubenfeld’s article deals with this problem no less elegantly or heroically than have others, but in the
end he cannot altogether escape the confining matrix of the Court’s cases either.  If the First Amend-
ment is to serve, then it too will have to be addressed in terms of its baseline deficiencies in interpreta-
tion, an undertaking primary among the tasks my colleague Jeff Powell and I have taken up in drafting
the manuscript for our book.  See supra note 32.
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copyright infringement.54  So viewed, fair use would not be limited in the protec-
tion it confers merely to those instances in which copyright infringement is
alleged.  It would extend as well, and as fully, to species of infringement recog-
nized under other doctrines, including the right of publicity, trademarks,
misappropriation in unfair competition, trade secrets, ideas, and even patents.
An agenda of this sort would require years to realize, of course, and more space
and time than I have to describe it now.  But limited even to a setting in which
the adversary is copyright, one can reimagine fair use as an aspect of the public
domain rather than of copyright itself, and envision a role for fair use well
beyond the one it now plays in that field.
In a work-in-progress Jennifer Anderson and I offered at the Law School’s
Public Domain Conference last year, we sketched in a vision of fair use for what
we called “transformative appropriations.”55  We have decided to continue
working on our model rather than publish it among the collection of papers in
this symposium.  But for the sake of example I will offer excerpts from our
working draft, edited to reflect the reconfigured public domain I have suggested
here in action.  Transformation, in the fashion proposed by Judge Leval,56 is no
longer at the center of our model.  Instead, fair use is invoked by any creative
act, including (thanks to Rubenfeld’s suggestion) an exercise of the creative
imagination.  The consequence of that invocation is an investiture of rights con-
ceptually akin to the rights invoked by a claim of citizenship:
Creative appropriation would be presumptively privileged in every instance, without
primary concern either for exploitation adversely affecting the economic value of an
antecedent work or for the reputation or sensibilities of its author or proprietor –
though in appropriate cases an equitable provision for sharing the proceeds of such
exploitations would follow, as would suitable provisions for disclaimers, acknowledg-
ments, attribution and the like.  The exclusive rights of authors under copyright,
54. In the text, notes, and citations immediately following, I will cut blindly across vast swaths of
prior writing by scholars, some whose works I know, and no doubt others whose publications have
escaped my notice.  I particularly acknowledge Professor Patterson (whose many writings in the field
have set an example for anyone who ventures into this area of the law), as well as his occasional writing
partner Professor Joyce; Professor Gordon (whose seminal essay on fair use as market failure has
helped shape all following debate in the field); Judge Leval (whose proposal with respect to transfor-
mative works has had great effect in the field); Professor Fisher (whose own much longer work on fair
use in some sense set the stage for Judge Leval’s later work); Professor Weinreb (whose vision of fair
use as “fair” I have thought especially attractive); Professor Netanel (whose work I always read with
great respect and interest); Judge Birch (whose opinion in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton-Mifflin Co.
reflects a deeper appreciation of fair use than is common among judges); Judge Kosinski (whose views
on appropriation and apportionment I think interesting, if not entirely persuasive); and David Nimmer
(whose writing on fair use, as on everything else, is truly remarkable).  In a different sort of essay I
would feel constrained to gather additional representative citations, so that the intellectual provenance
of the things said by me here would be both manifest and thorough.  On this occasion, however, when
my purpose frankly is to present a straightforward polemic rather than conventional scholarship, I shall
beg the reader’s indulgence, and content myself with acknowledging that most of what I propose has
probably been anticipated elsewhere, whether or not it has been assembled in quite the same way.
55. See David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative Critical
Appropriation (2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf (last visited Feb.
10, 2003).  The introduction included here has been added since the work was posted.  This work
remains a work in progress, and is accordingly incomplete.
56. See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990); Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449 (1997).
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including rights in derivative works, would be subordinated accordingly, but would
remain otherwise unaffected.57
No revision to the Copyright Act would be required, in our view.  Section
107 already supports (we would say commands) a reading that makes its provi-
sions superior to the provisions of section 106.58
And how far would this carry us toward our goal of affirmative protection
for creative appropriation?
If we presuppose the necessary creative exercise in connection with the appropriation,
then rarely, if ever, should fair use be withheld merely on account of either functional
or aesthetic equivalency between the two works.  It may be that a secondary work
appears to add nothing at all to the creative offices already reflected in an antecedent
work; and in that case perhaps it would be appropriate to inquire further into the justi-
fication for fair use.  While such a scenario can be envisioned in theory, it is exceed-
ingly unlikely to be encountered in practice, absent the boldest forms of appropriation
through the simplest forms of copying, followed by publication to persons already
identically addressed by the proprietor of the antecedent work.  And even in that case,
an identical creative exercise in the second work, fairly judged to have prompted that
appropriation (whether or not independently), would justify the claim of fair use
nonetheless.  Should Lauren Greenfield take up painting, for example, the fact that
she may produce works of the sort that Damian Loeb produces does not mean that
Loeb’s independent conceptions would not continue to be privileged.  Indeed, it is
entirely possible, under the analysis we propose, that Loeb and Greenfield might each
identically counter-appropriate the other’s expression, so as to produce works indis-
tinguishable from each other, each claiming fair use in his or her respective appropria-
tion.  Weird as this may seem in the imagining, it is but a corollary to Hand’s own con-
templation as to the unobjectionable replicability of Keats’ “Ode To A Grecian Urn”:
copyright always presupposes the possibility of works identical in expression, yet
independently conceived.
From the perspective of mere identity or functional equivalency, then, fair use would
be withheld only when no creative exercise could be discerned in the second work at
all.  Straightforward piracy would continue to be forbidden, of course, and might even
be regulated more closely in the absence of any lingering concern for fair use.  But
piracy could not effectively be urged in a transaction merely because the second work,
if licensed, would amount to a derivative work.  Under this analysis, to the contrary,
the question of derivative work status is of no greater consequence than would follow
57. Lange & Anderson, supra note 55.  The idea of apportionment of profits is by no means new,
and it has seemed just, as opposed to a kind of winner-take-all outcome in fair use.  It is a useful way to
accommodate the fourth factor under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000)
(“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”).  I contem-
plated apportionment in passing in Recognizing the Public Domain, supra note 1, at 174, although there
I considered it primarily in conceptual terms, rather than in the immediate context of fair use.  Among
its recent proponents are Professors Netanel and Rubenfeld, as well as Judge Kosinski, who suggested
it in the course of his Brace Memorial Lecture.  But I have had some second thoughts about whether
this idea is in fact as useful or as fair as it seems.  Specifically, I wonder whether it does not unwisely
entangle the legitimacy of creative appropriation with the wholly separate (and essentially adventi-
tious) question of profits and revenue streams.  I shall not try to work this out in a footnote, but do
want to record my reservation about the issue.  (It is one of the reasons Jennifer Anderson and I have
temporarily withdrawn our fair use essay from publication.)
58. The texts of the two sections suggest as much on their face: 17 U.S.C. § 106 is “subject to sec-
tions 107 through 122”; 17 U.S.C. § 107 applies “notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A.”  In SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001), Judge
Birch suggested that fair use, properly understood, is an affirmative right, not an affirmative defense.
See also Kulzick & Hogue, supra note 16.
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were the second work a simple copy.  If an exercise of the creative imagination
invokes fair use, then the exclusive rights must gracefully step aside pro tanto.59
Ah, but then: “straightforward piracy?” I can hear James Boyle asking,
“What does that mean?”
It means an appropriation unmotivated by any creative exercise, including
an exercise of the creative imagination.  And how do we know when we are in
the presence of such an exercise?  There is no escaping: we must decide.  In
Rubenfeld’s approach to this issue, he establishes what seem to me to be cate-
gories of conduct leading one to conclude that imagination is at work or not.60
The bright lines that result I have already suggested may be more restrictive
than the fair use model I have just outlined is meant to be.  In my view, the
decision ought to be grounded in fact-finding affected by law: The decision of a
trial judge should be reviewable in plenary fashion by a court of appeal.  The
presumption should be fair use.61
And what of the most extreme cases?  In private correspondence, initiated
by David Nimmer and joined in by Neil Netanel, Jed Rubenfeld and me, we
have asked that question of each other, having Rubenfeld’s article in mind.
Consider, as we have, a hypothetical (somewhat distorted from the original put
by Jorge Borges) in which Cervantes’ Don Quixote is “recreated” word for
word by a later “author” to the pleasurable reception of those who have not
read it before because, until its recreation, it had seemed merely an antique.62  Is
this an exercise of the imagination?  I think it fair to say the members of our ad
hoc discussion group are of mixed minds about the matter.  But I would say it
all depends on what the putative junior creator has in mind.  Appropriation is
creative, I think, and therefore qualifies as an exercise of the creative imagina-
tion, when we see in it the qualities or attributes we recognize in conceptual art
of any kind.63  And if the answer to the question is debatable or in doubt, then
the junior creator should prevail as against all efforts by a senior party to forbid
the appropriation, for the cardinal rule of good citizenship under the protective
  59. Lange & Anderson, supra note 55, at 151.
60. See Rubenfeld, supra note 37, at 48-49.
61. In my view the availability of such a presumption is a necessary prerequisite to any adequate
theory of the public domain.  Indeed, that is essentially where this essay begins.  See text accompanying
supra notes 1 & 2.
62. Cf. David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 1, 41 n.154 (2001).  This article is a masterwork, nothing less, and cannot be adequately acknowl-
edged in less extravagant terms.  But do note, gentle reader, that Nimmer is addressing conceptual sub-
tleties and nuances well beyond the single issue—imagining protection for creativity as a function of the
public domain—that mainly engages me here.  Read Nimmer for the sheer pleasure of the experience;
and then see whether you can ever feel quite the same about the plausibility in Learned Hand’s spin (in
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (1936)) on Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn.”  If
you can, you may be ready for a conservator, as Nimmer suggests, but you are also probably ready for
creativity as I see it.  The two propositions are in no part inconsistent.
63. See Schiff, supra note 26.  Even this splendidly satisfying conception of creativity may not go as
far as one might like.  “Making a find” is creative, as Schiff says; I would argue that even the “find” may
be creative, if motivated in play.  See David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the
Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Spring
1992) [hereinafter Lange, At Play].
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reach of the public domain is that doubtful cases ought always to be resolved in
favor of appropriation.
Certainly, appropriation of a very ordinary sort can amount to an exercise of
the creative imagination.  In his provocative essay on fair use included among
the papers in this symposium,64 David Nimmer publishes for the first time the
contents of a poem written by Anne Frank in 1940 to a friend whose birthday
party in Amsterdam young Anne attended, perhaps for the last time.  “Dear
Henny,”  Anne Frank wrote on that occasion, “Pluck roses on earth, and forget
me not.”65  The words are haunting now, poignant, simple, terribly sweet and
sad.  They call to us from across the years with a power they surely could not
have possessed when first they were penned.  Yet I would have said they were
unmistakably creative then.  Who today would deny that they are imagination
exemplified?
But I am obliged to report—on the authority of David Nimmer himself, who
discovered what I am about to relate after his own article had gone to press—
that these words also appear to have been appropriated verbatim from an
anthology of poems widely available in The Netherlands at the time.  The poet
who wrote them was named Snelders.  His work appears to have been
composed in 1895, and might plausibly have remained under copyright in 1940.66
Was Anne Frank a creator on the occasion when she wrote her note to
Henny?  I have said I think so, and my opinion remains unchanged.
But was she an author?  Perhaps not, in the conventional understanding of
that term in copyright.  Was she a plagiarist, a pirate, a thief?  No decent person
would lay such a charge against her memory.  She was just a young girl, barely
ten years old, a friend writing to a friend on the occasion of a celebration.  Pre-
supposing copyright, was this fair use?  Yes, surely then—and even now, under
the tedious and inexact standards of our time.  But I submit that these are the
wrong questions, and not merely for obvious reasons of decency.  The questions
are wrong because, coming as they do from within the matrix of copyright, they
are motivated by the wrong priorities and the wrong concerns.
It is wrong to challenge school children with responsibility for copyright.
Wrong for copyright to intrude into private lives.  Wrong to measure creativity
by the standards of copyright.  Wrong to lay impediments (moral, intellectual,
legal) before exercises of the imagination, whether great or small.  Wrong, in
short, to rob us of this vital aspect of our citizenship: the right to think as we
please and to speak as we think.
We must learn to reimagine the public domain.  We must learn to ask ques-
tions from within the province of that new status, a status like citizenship,
measured by creativity and the imagination, and invoked by an exercise of
64. David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 263 (Winter/Spring 2003).
65. Id. at 284-85.
66. E-mail from David Nimmer (Nov. 21, 2002) (on file with author).
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either.  For then Anne Frank’s answer to the question of entitlement will be our
common answer: Civis musarum sum.
James Boyle is right, of course.  There are many public domains.  Perhaps
we must recognize them all.  But for myself and others like me, I want the
public domain, however it may be defined, to secure these elemental aspirations
which I believe innate in human kind: to think and to imagine, to remember and
appropriate, to play and to create.67  It will be enough if recognizing the public
domain brings us to that end.
67. See Lange, At Play, supra note 63.
